BOOK REVIEWS
THE MAKING OF THE OZONE HOLE Ozone Crisis: The 15-Year Evolution of a Sudden Global Emergency by Sharon L. Roan John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1989 270 pages, $18.95 Reviewed by John Abbotts John Abbotts, a research biochemist, has published more than 20 articles on science, technology, and public policy and is co- author with Ralph Nader of The Menace of Atomic Energy (W.W. Norton). IN MARCH 1988, Joseph Glas, director of DuPont Corporation's Freon division, informed his family that the company had promised to stop producing chemicals shown to damage the world's ozone layer. When his children responded "Dad, that's fantastic," he told the New York Times "I know I'm doing something that's important, and it felt good." But while this decision may have brought satisfaction to one executive and his family, the response of the chemical industry as a whole to the destruction of the ozone layer is hardly a model of corporate responsibility. Ozone Crisis by Sharon Roan, describes how, faced with the possibility that its products posed a global threat, the industry stalled, calling for more research and working to delay regulations that might reduce sales. As a case in point, DuPont's 1988 promise was mostly a public relations ploy; in terms of implementation, it had no teeth. The company set no timetable, and offered to halt production only when alternative chemicals were available. Roan, science writer for the Orange County Register, tells the story of the development of this environmental crisis, starting in 1973, when Mario Molina, a research chemist at the University of California, Irvine, showed his faculty adviser, Sherwood Rowland, some calculations on the potential effects of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), synthetic chemicals with many commercial applications. Molina reasoned that CFCs would travel into the stratosphere to encounter the ozone layer, a region with the capacity to absorb ultraviolet light, thereby reducing the amount which reaches the earth's surface. Molina found that as CFCs wafted into the upper atmosphere, ultraviolet light was breaking them down, setting off a chain of chemical reactions which could destroy ozone. The implications were severe: increased ultraviolet radiation could increase skin cancers and cataracts, cut crop yields and reduce the population of plankton in the world's waters, thereby upsetting the ocean's food chain; in short, life on earth could be threatened. Even worse, CFCs could take many decades to reach the ozone layer, which meant a long lag time for the consequences. By the time damage was seen clearly, it might be too late to prevent a global catastrophe. Rowland and Molina published their figures in a scientific journal, and began to call publicly for limits on CFC production. At this point, the chemical industry's only response was to label the scientists' work unproven and argue that there was no evidence that CFCs were harming the ozone. It urged no action. Ozone Crisis takes on the question of when public policy changes are appropriate in situations where there are scientific uncertainties. Although Roan presents both sides of the controversy, she makes clear her view that because of the dangers of delay on ozone protection "Prudence would suggest that the chemicals be banned before any damage was done." But rather than prudence, Roan writes, the corporate community focused on its "first line of defense-preserving profits," although at the time of DuPont's announcement, CFCs provided less than 2 percent of the company's total earnings. Curtis Moore, who was a staff member for a U.S. Senate environmental committee during this controversy, points out that the industry used the lack of absolute, definitive proof to avoid making a responsible decision. "Here were people who were willing to say they ought not be required to modify their behavior one scintilla until they had massively disturbed one of the fundamental parameters under which life had evolved on earth," Roan quotes him saying. Fortunately for the earth, the evidence which the chemical manufacturers demanded did mount, albeit with little help from industry. The research was conducted in large part by independent investigators, supported by public funds, especially scientists with the National Aerospace Association (NASA) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) or university scientists funded by those agencies. A British team discovered that an ozone "hole" formed over Antarctica each winter. In 1988, a scientific panel convened by NASA reported measurable depletion of world ozone levels. A few days later, DuPont, the world's largest producer of CFCs, announced its promise eventually to phase out production of CFCs. Though one reason DuPont gave for the indefinite delay was the availability of substitutes at that time, that lack was also something for which the company was responsible. CFC substitutes were not available because industry had abandoned research on alternatives in the early 1980s. The industry was not alone in its failure to address this global threat. The government response was lethargic, at best. After two petitions (the first was rejected) from the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), federal agencies in 1977 banned CFCs in aerosol sprays. The early Reagan years were marked by hostility to environmental preservation in general and it was not until Ronald Reagan's second term that EPA administrator Lee Thomas responded to a new NRDC petition by supporting a phase-out of all CFC production. Even then, Interior Secretary Donald Hodel and the White House science adviser opposed the EPA position. The White House proposed an alternative which it called the "personal protection" option. But the suggestion that individuals should use sunscreen and wear sunglasses and large hats instead of turning to government regulation for protection was widely ridiculed, and the Hodel plan was discarded. The chemical industry used the worldwide nature of the ozone problem as a stalling tactic, arguing that restrictions by one country would be meaningless without an international compact. When multinational negotiations, under the auspices of the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) commenced, other nations proved even more reluctant than the United States to impose conditions on their manufacturers. Government-industry ties appeared strong. At some sessions, for example, the West German and Japanese delegates were chemical industry representatives. But, in 1987, after protracted negotiations, 43 nations signed the Montreal Protocol, agreeing to reduce CFC production by 50 percent by the end of the century. Subsequent ozone depletion led EPA to call for strengthening of the protocol to 100 percent reduction. Roan concludes by discussing the greenhouse effect, to which CFCs also contribute. The parallel with the ozone crisis is the threat of global climate change, but the problem is more complex since several factors contribute to the greenhouse effect: fossil fuel combustion produces carbon dioxide, another greenhouse gas; and deforestation destroys trees that normally absorb carbon dioxide. These activities take place in developed and developing nations alike, and it is likely that another international agreement will be needed to prevent disaster. While models to predict the extent of global warming are still being refined, greenhouse gases continue to accumulate, setting warming trends in motion. Roan urges that the lessons of the ozone crisis be applied and action taken on the greenhouse effect before clear evidence is in. Those opposed to action, such as the Bush White House, argue that scientific uncertainty may mean that global warming can be mitigated, but they have to acknowledge that uncertainties leave open the possibility that the problem could be worse than expected. In the meantime, actions that could avert global warming, such as more efficient energy use, development of renewable energy alternatives and forest preservation and restoration, would have beneficial environmental and economic effects in their own right. As a science journalist, Roan is able to explain accurately the complexities of technical controversies. But her narrative tends to drag when she focuses on science, rather than public policy struggles. All the same, she provides a comprehensive chronicle of the ozone depletion issue which is lucid and accessible to a general audience of concerned citizens. In fact, citizens and governments have found ways to "think globally, act locally" on this issue. Initiatives at state and local levels are not merely symbolic; they can serve as models and harbingers for broader responses. For example, in 1975 the state of Oregon banned the use of CFCs in aerosols; two years later, the U.S. government followed suit. In July 1989, the City Council of Irvine, California implemented stringent controls on CFC production and use. Irvine Mayor Larry Agran endorsed the action, noting, "We are very eager to prod our national government and international bodies to act much more quickly in the face of this global emergency." In the long-term, the intransigence of the chemical industry on CFCs seems self-defeating. It does not seem logical for companies to pursue a path that may threaten the lives of their consumers and employees, and eventually their own existence. Roan quotes a California disc jockey who makes this point by asking, "Just what planet do they expect to live on?" The institutional reflex to maximize short-term gain is so deeply engrained that enlightened self-interest is insufficient to produce corporate responsibility. Only governments pushed by concerned citizens can impose the necessary reforms. Increased communications between activists and Green parties everywhere will be necessary to prevent multinational corporations from playing governments off one another. Because pollution transcends national borders, so must environmental politics. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ [] MULTINATIONAL MONITOR VOLUME 11, NUMBER 3, MARCH 1990 A GREEN FUTURE FOR U.S. POLITICS? Environmentalism and the Future of Progressive Politics by Robert C. Paehlke Yale University Press: New Haven, 1989 325 pages, $26.00 Reviewed by Jonathan Dushoff ROBERT PAEHLKE UNDERTAKES two major tasks in his book Environmentalism and the Future of Progressive Politics. He draws a picture of various possibilities for a coherent environmental ideology and an environmentally sound future; and he offers an analysis of the political future of environmentalism, concluding that although it is a fundamentally separate ideology, an alliance between environmentalists and what he terms moderate progressives might be both beneficial and possible in the "Anglo-American democracies:" Britain, Canada and the United States. He manages his first task with greater success than his second. The book opens by reviewing the environmentalist thinking of the 1960s, which Paehlke describes as dominated by utopians, envisioning a "decentralized, bucolic and organic" future, and doomsayers, predicting environmental catastrophe and a Hobbesian world where life is "nasty, brutish and short." Drawing heavily on the work of others, Paehlke envisions a future somewhere between those two extremes. The first section also includes a review of the history of environmental thinking. Though he acknowledges the importance of many of the early conservationist authors, Paehlke explains that because the goals of forest preservation and oil conservation seem like concerns of the privileged who do not need to worry about their basic financial security, the conservation movement had an "elite" tone and lacked broad political appeal. By contrast, Paehlke writes, many of the issues of the modern environmental movement, such as pollution and occupational safety, affect people more immediately and thus have potential for greater popular appeal. He points out that the same toxins which cause danger and damage in the workplace also have the potential to cause problems in the wider environment, and suggests that by emphasizing occupational issues, environmentalists will be able to gain support from a wide segment of the working community. With this support, Paehlke argues, environmentalists may have the power to bring about real changes which have the potential to reduce the threat to the earth's ecosystem. Paehlke concurs with Amory Lovins, author and energy analyst, that the grim scenarios of destruction or harsh austerity measures envisioned by many environmentalists are not inevitable or even likely. The reaction to the oil crises of the seventies proved that there is a great deal of potential for conservation. Paehlke maintains that conserving energy and using localized, renewable forms of energy, and eventually abandoning non- renewable forms as Lovins suggests, will make it possible to continue indefinitely at roughly the present standard of living. He proposes a program of controlled and gradually rising oil prices to eliminate the economic dislocation associated with sudden rises and falls in prices, and also to encourage conservation and the development of other energy sources. Paehlke asserts that there is no contradiction between a high standard of living and environmentalism; the trick is to maintain a high standard of living with relatively low use of materials and energy. Recycling and organic agricultural practices, for example, are environmentally sound practices and, in addition, are labor-intensive, so they would create more jobs than the shift from current practices would displace. Paehlke sees increases in the Gross National Product (GNP) as a possibility, even in a "sustainable" economy that does not use up non-renewable resources, though he quarrels with the idea that GNP growth is necessary for a healthy economy. Though perhaps not a lower standard of living, Paehlke's view of the future does include a different way of life. He foresees greater dependence on public transportation and recycling and reuse of materials. More use would be made, he says, of durable and repairable products instead of disposable ones. It would also include a greater role for automation to free people from drudgery. He suggests that full employment be achieved simply by dividing up whatever work is available among the workforce, anticipating a time when 20 hour work weeks will be common. In the future, according to Paehlke, economic activities will be less dependent on material and energy use. The industries of the future will include telecommunications, information, scholarship, art and entertainment. Advances in such areas could be accomplished with relatively little use of energy and materials. Improved communications could also help reduce the demand for transportation. Paehlke is also optimistic about the political viability of his vision of the future, suggesting that environmental issues transcend ideology. He defines the differences between the left and the right extremes of the political spectrum in terms of distribution of wealth; those on the right, he says, support schemes which favor the wealthy, those on the left favor helping the less advantaged. Using this rather narrow model, he asserts that environmentalism is consistent with either a left-wing or a rightwing approach, depending on who bears the costs of environmental programs. He gives, as an example, of right-wing environmentalism a program in Ontario where timber companies are paid by the government for reseeding areas where they have logged. These companies make a profit on the arrangement. Despite his insistence, that environmentalism can be set apart from the traditional left-right spectrum, Paehlke also suggests that the neo-conservative hostility toward environmental measures may make an alliance between environmentalism and moderate progressivism possible. He does not explain, however, the impact of this hostility on his theory that environmentalism stands outside the left-right spectrum. Although full of interesting ideas and discussions, the book has a number of weak spots. The analysis of the popularity of neo- conservatism and the decline of what Paehlke calls "moderate progressivism"--basically mainstream liberalism--is unconvincing. In explaining the sources of support for his broad "environmental ideology," Paehlke fails to explain how support for such measures as pollution control, workplace safety and recycling can be translated into support for the ideology as a whole, which includes such things as a planned rise in oil prices and a shortened work week. He presents these proposals as an inherent part of an environmentalist view, when, in fact, they are at best marginally environmental proposals which have yet to gain popularity on their own. Paehlke admits that the reduced work week, which might come at the expense of salary increases, would be unpopular in many circles. And as with his proposal for the controlled, negotiated rise in oil prices, he offers little evidence that this plan is workable. The more fundamental flaw in Paehlke's argument lies in his assertion that environmentalism fits within the parameters of both leftist and rightist perspectives. The environmental crises facing society today will not go away until real changes are made in our production processes. It is not likely that these changes will be welcomed by those who profit from the current system. Conservatives, in particular, even as narrowly defined by Paehlke, who finds wealth to be the defining characteristic of the right, will oppose government-imposed reforms of business practices. Thus, an environmentalist agenda which addresses the basic problems will not lie, as Paehlke claims, outside of a left-right perspective. Any environmentalism that truly deals with the problems facing the earth today is going to threaten the right, even if the right is defined solely as those with the money. Because the changes needed are fundamental and will result in great shifts in the economic structure, they are not likely to be accepted calmly much less welcomed by those who currently profit from the existing structure. It is a strong rhetorical point that saving our environment is in everyone's best interests; but Paehlke tries to ignore the reality that radical changes will be fought by those who perceive their interests to lie elsewhere. Nonetheless, the book is distinctly worth reading for its survey of environmental ideas, and particularly for Paehlke's skilful synthesis of these ideas into intriguing views of possible, environmentally sound, yet livable, futures. .